Irish election 8 February 2020

For material on Ireland's 2016 election, click here. For material on Ireland's 2011 election, click here. For results of the 2019 European Parliament elections in Ireland, click here. For information on results of Irish elections 1948 to 2007, click here. For information on results of Irish elections 1922 to 1944, including the exceptional election of June 1927, click here. For arguments for and against retaining PR-STV as Ireland's electoral system click here.

This page was created and continuously updated during the 2020 election campaign.

How Ireland Voted 2020 has been published by Springer under the Palgrave Macmillan imprint.

– – – – – – – –

HOW IRELAND VOTED 2020: the end of an era

Publication: it has now been published, available in all good bookshops or online
Website: https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030664046

Chapter Abstracts are here.

Edited by Michael Gallagher, Michael Marsh, Theresa Reidy

Contents

List of tables
List of figures
Notes on contributors
Preface
Glossary and abbreviations
Chronology of election 2020
Photographs from election 2020

1 The road to the election – Gary Murphy (DCU)
2 Election pledge fulfilment under minority government – Rory Costello (UL), Alice Sheridan (UL) and Duncan Casey (UL)
3 Too many, too few: candidate selection in 2020 – Theresa Reidy (UCC)
4 Campaign strategies: the inside story of how the election was fought – Pat Leahy (IT)
5 Brexit and the election: the issue that wasn’t – Mary C. Murphy (UCC)
6 Media and the election: social and traditional media narratives in the campaign – Kirsty Park (DCU) and Jane Suiter (DCU)
7 On the campaign trail – Mairéad Farrell (SF), James O’Connor (FF), Jennifer Carroll MacNeill (FG), Roderic O’Gorman (Grn), Marie Sherlock (Lab) and Jennifer Whitmore (SD)
8 The results analysed: the definitive end of the traditional party system? – Michael Gallagher (TCD)
9 Geographical factors in constituency voting patterns – Adrian Kavanagh (NUIM), William Durkan (NUIM) and Caoilfhionn D’Arcy (NUIM)
10 Voting behaviour: the Sinn Féin election – Kevin Cunningham (TUD) and Michael Marsh (TCD)
11 The evolving nature of the Irish policy space – Lisa Keenan (TCD) and Gail McElroy (TCD)
12 The Seanad election: voting in unprecedented times – Claire McGing (IADT)
13 The slow formation of government – Eoin O’Malley (DCU)
14 The election in context – John Coakley (UCD)
Appendices – Samuel Johnston (TCD)
Appendix 1 – Detailed results of the 2020 general election
Appendix 2 – Members of the 33rd Dáil
Appendix 3 – The government and ministers of state
Appendix 4 – The Irish electoral system
Appendix 5 – Retirements and defeated incumbents from the 32nd Dáil
Index

– – – – – – – –

The 2016 election was branded 'The election that nobody won', and was the subject of How Ireland Voted 2016, published by Palgrave Macmillan later that year. The results of the 2011 election justified the tag 'earthquake election'. This is incorporated into the subtitle of How Ireland Voted 2011, which was published by Palgrave Macmillan in October 2011. How Ireland Voted 2020 is the ninth book in the How Ireland Voted series.

Results 2020

The February 2020 election is fully analysed in How Ireland Voted 2020 (Springer / Palgrave Macmillan, June 2021); see details above. The raw figures are:

Electorate: 3,509,969. Turnout (valid votes / electorate): 62.21% (-2.32% compared with the 2016 figure), though the uncertain state of the electoral register means that not too much importance should be attached to this.

Note: Figures exclude the 160th TD, the outgoing Ceann Comhairle (Speaker), a Fianna Fáil TD returned without contest. Some parties or groups that contested the 2016 election did not contest this time, which explains why the gains and losses do not always add to zero.

Source: Official figures from Dept of the Environment.

Fragmentation and disproportionality

Disproportionality was exceptionally low; the figure of 2.22 is the lowest since February 1982 and the fourth lowest ever. The election delivered a higher degree of proportionality than the most recent elections in, for example, Denmark, Finland and Norway. This highly proportional outcome is largely due to Sinn Féin's under-nomination of candidates, which meant that it missed out on 10–11 seats. Had it won these, it would have received a significant seat bonus, and disproportionality would have been higher; as it was, its actual total of 37 seats was very close to its 'fair' share, namely 39 seats. Fragmentation of the votes was down slightly on 2016, though still the second highest ever, while fragmentation of seats reached a new record high; legislative fragmentation is around twice as high as the average figure for the elections of the period from September 1927 to 2007 inclusive.

Note: figures based on treating 'Independents 4 Change' as a party and all other independents as separate units.

If seats were allocated purely on the basis of total national first preference votes, and if all votes had been cast as they were on 8 February, then the allocation of the 159 seats under the Sainte-Laguë method (generally seen as the 'fairest' since it does not systematically favour either larger or smaller parties) would have been SF 42, FF 38, FG 35, Greens 12, Labour 7, Soc Dems 5, Solidarity–PBP 4, Aontú 3, Independents 4 Change 1. The remaining 12 seats would have gone to Independents: Michael Healy-Rae, Michael Lowry, Michael Fitzmaurice, Michael Collins, Mattie McGrath, Danny Healy-Rae, Denis Naughten, Noel Grealish, Sean Canney, Michael McNamara, Marian Harkin and Kevin Boxer Moran. LSq would be 2.23 and Ns 5.39.

Under the D'Hondt method, which tends to give the benefit of the doubt to larger parties, the figures would have been SF 45, FF 40, FG 38, Greens 13, Labour 8, Soc Dems 5, Solidarity–PBP 4, Aontú 3. There would have been only 3 Independent TDs: Michael Healy-Rae, Michael Lowry and Michael Fitzmaurice. LSq would be 4.28 and Ns 4.72.

Turnover of TDs

Renewal amounted to around a third of the Dáil. Of the 158 men and women who were TDs as of 1 December 2019, a total of 54 are not members of the 33rd Dáil: 1 resigned his seat later in December, 18 retired at the election, and 35 were defeated. Of the latter, 29 lost to a candidate of another party and 6 (5 from FF and 1 from FG) were unseated by a running mate. With the Dáil having increased from 158 to 160 TDs, these were replaced by 56 incoming TDs, of whom 8 are former TDs returning after an absence (2 SF, 2 FG, 2 Labour, 2 independents) and 48 are first-time TDs.

As always, incumbents fared better pro rata than non-incumbents, and almost three-quarters of those who stood for re-election were successful.

The 103 candidates with the most votes received more votes than the other 428 put together. Altogether, there were 152 candidates who received fewer than 1,000 first preference votes.

Two candidates were elected with fewer than 3,000 first preferences: Joan Collins (I4C, Dublin SC) and Gary Gannon (SD, Dublin Central). In contrast, one candidate (Timmy Dooley, FF, Clare) received 7,763 votes without being elected, and six other unsuccessful candidates also received more than 7,000 first preferences.

Female representation in the Dáil

Effectively no change. The candidate gender quota – the proportion of women, and of men, that parties must have among their candidates if they are not to forfeit part of their state funding – remained unchanged at 30 per cent, and as the table further down the page shows most of the larger parties complied with this in no more than a rather minimalist fashion. Only the Green Party, Solidarity–PBP and the Social Democrats reached a 60–40 balance, which will be required from 2023 onwards. The absence of change in this requirement for the 2020 election led to an expectation that there would be very little change in the gender balance within the Dáil, and so it proved. In 2016, 35 of the 158 TDs were women (22.2 per cent). In 2019, 2 of these resigned their seats upon election to the European Parliament, and at the resulting by-elections they were replaced by male TDs, so at the dissolution there were 33 women TDs. Once the 2020 election was called, a further 2 women TDs decided not to contest, while 12 outgoing female TDs who did contest lost their seats. 19 female incumbent TDs were re-elected, and 17 new female TDs (one was a former TD) were elected, making the total in the 33rd Dáil 36 out of 160 (22.5 per cent). The highest proportions of women among the various party Dáil groups are in the Social Democrats (67 per cent) and Sinn Féin (34 per cent), and the lowest proportions are within Labour (0 per cent), Fianna Fáil (13 per cent), Greens (17 per cent), Fine Gael (17 per cent), and Solidarity–PBP (20 per cent).

In three constituencies a majority of TDs are female: Cavan–Monaghan, Dublin Rathdown, and Galway West. In a further three the gender balance is even: Dublin Central, Dublin South-Central, and Kildare North. But in 12 there are no female TDs at all: Cork East, Cork North-Central, Cork North-West, Cork South-Central, Donegal, Dublin Bay South, Dublin South-West, Dublin West, Limerick City, Limerick County, Meath West, and Tipperary.

As in 2016, on average male candidates won more votes than female candidates; of course, in order to assess the effect of gender upon votes received, any analysis would need to control for such factors as party and incumbency:

Note: the 160th TD, returned without a contest as outgoing Ceann Comhairle, is male.

Government formation

For the first time ever, no two parties command a majority of seats in the Dáil, so a majority government required at least three parties. Matters were complicated by promises made before the election by the leaders of FG and FF not to enter coalition with SF, and (it seemed, anyway) by the leader of FF not to enter coalition with FG. After week one of the post-election period, it seemed that this latter stance was under review and that a coalition government involving FF, FG and one or two smaller parties might be formed in due course, though the idea was said to be meeting some internal resistance within FG in particular.

Eventually, on 27 June (exactly 20 weeks after polling day), the Dáil elected a new government, a coalition between FF, FG and the Green Party. The full story is in Chapter 13 of How Ireland Voted 2020.

[Sections below were written before election day, and have been largely left unamended since then]:

The 2020 election

On Tuesday 14 January 2020 the President of Ireland, Michael D Higgins, acting on the advice of the Taoiseach (prime minister), Leo Varadkar, dissolved the 32nd Dáil. The 33rd Dáil is to be elected on Saturday 8 February, said to be the first general election held on a Saturday since 1918 (most elections have been held on a Thursday or a Friday); polling stations will be open from 7 am to 10 pm. Nominations of candidates closed at noon on 22 January.

The 33rd Dáil will have 160 members, two more than the 32nd. One of these, the Ceann Comhairle (speaker) will be deemed elected without a contest, leaving 159 to be elected by means of the PR-STV electoral system (see ballot paper). These 160 TDs will be returned from 39 constituencies: 9 3-seat constituencies, 17 4-seat constituencies, and 13 5-seat constituencies. Average district magnitude, at 4.10 seats per constituency, is exceptionally low by the standards of PR electoral systems, which is a major reason for the level of disproportionality (lack of complete correspondence between parties' vote shares and seat shares) at recent Irish elections. Once voting finishes, the ballot boxes will be sealed and then brought overnight to a central counting point within each constituency. Checking and counting of the votes begins at around 9 am on Sunday 9 February, and the first TD is likely to be declared elected between 2 and 3 pm. Because the counting of votes under PR-STV is a multi-stage process, the final results of the election may not be known until early the next week, though most constituencies will complete their counting on 9 February.

Compared with the 2016 election, 18 constituencies are completely unchanged. In some other cases, there have been minor boundary adjustments. There are only four major changes, in each cases involving boundary adjustments: (i) Cavan–Monaghan changes from a 4-seat to a 5-seat constituency; (ii) Dublin Central changes from a 3-seat to a 4-seat constituency; (iii) Kildare South changes from a 3-seat to a 4-seat constituency; (iv) the two 3-seat constituencies of Laois and Offaly (re)join together as one 5-seat constituency. Because the Ceann Comhairle was returned from Dun Laoghaire in 2016, the number of contested seats there rises from 3 to 4, and since in 2020 the outgoing Ceann Comhairle is a TD from Kildare South, the number of contested seats there remains at 3 despite the additional seat it received in the pre-election redistricting.

The 33rd Dáil is due to convene on Thursday 20 February. First, by secret ballot, it will elect its new Ceann Comhairle. Once this is over, the Dáil's next business is to elect a Taoiseach. In the past, this has usually been a straightforward matter, as between election day and the Dáil's first meeting parties have agreed to form a majority coalition government – for example, when the 31st Dáil first met, Enda Kenny (FG) was elected Taoiseach by 117 votes to 27. Perhaps this, or something similar, will happen on 20 February, but it may well be that no candidate for the office wins a vote; the election of a Taoiseach proceeds by names being voted on individually in sequence, and it is possible that each one is defeated, ie that more votes are cast against each one than in his or her favour. If that occurs, the current Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar, must tender his resignation to the President but he and his government remain in office until, once some inter-party arrangement has been reached, the Dáil either confirms them in position or elects a different Taoiseach. When the 32nd Dáil first met in 2016 several votes failed to elect a Taoiseach, and government formation was to take 70 days; the government elected was a coalition between Fine Gael and some independent TDs, sustained by an agreement under which Fianna Fáil undertook not to oppose it in confidence or budgetary motions. There is no fixed time limit on how long such a situation – of a 'caretaker' Taoiseach and government – can continue, but given that such a government would be unable to implement any contentious policy the likelihood is that if there seemed to be no prospect of the deadlock being broken there would be a fresh general election.

Background to the election

To sum up four years of political developments in one paragraph: The minority coalition between Fine Gael and independents took office in May 2016, following the conclusion of a 'supply and confidence' arrangement with Fianna Fáil, which undertook not to oppose the government on budgetary matters or issues of confidence while being free to oppose it on any other matter. The economy made major advances at the macro level during its term, but not everyone benefited, and it was clear that there were significant problems in the health services along with a growing problem of homelessness. The government claimed credit for guaranteeing that the UK's final Brexit deal minimised the damage to Ireland, though this issue did not divide the Irish parties. Similarly, while the government claimed credit for initiating the May 2018 referendum that legalised abortion in Ireland, all the main parties had supported this move. Enda Kenny, who had become FG leader in 2002 and Taoiseach in 2011, stood down in June 2017 and he was succeeded in both roles by Leo Varadkar. Fianna Fáil and Labour did not change their leaders between 2016 and 2020, but in SF Gerry Adams stood down as leader in February 2018 after 35 years and was succeeded by Mary Lou McDonald. At the May 2019 local and European Parliament elections the Green Party made striking advances, and entered the 2020 campaign in an upbeat mood.

Fine Gael receives the boost and the problems that come with incumbency. Clearly, not everything in the country that is less than perfect is its fault, but when any party has been in office for nine years it finds it difficult to avoid being blamed. And while arguing for a first term in government ('Time for a change') or a second term ('Let us finish the job') is straightforward enough, making the case for a third term is more of a challenge.

Candidates

Nominations closed at 12 noon on Wednesday 22 January. The absence of a central database of candidates makes it a challenge to gather all the data. Official notices of poll are available from most returning officers' sites; the sites of some returning officers do not have the notice of poll; and some returning officers, remarkably, do not even have a site. It appears that the total number of candidates is 531, slightly below the 551 at the 2016 election but still the third highest number ever. Parties in receipt of state funding lose a portion of this funding unless at least 30 per cent of their candidates are female (and at least 30 per cent are male); all the parties receiving such funding met the threshold, in several cases only narrowly.

Note: one of the SF candidates categorised under 'Others' is an incumbent MEP. Of the 37 Solidarity–PBP candidates, 27 are standing for the PBP, 9 for Solidarity and 1 (Paul Murphy TD) for Rise, the organisation he founded when leaving Solidarity in September 2019.

How many candidates are alumni of the Department of Political Science, Trinity College Dublin?

There are at least seven. In alphabetical order, with graduation date, these are: Carly Bailey (Soc Dem, Dublin SW; 2019); Dara Calleary (FF, Mayo; 1996); Jennifer Carroll MacNeill (FG, Dun Laoghaire, 2002); Jack Chambers (FF, Dublin W; 2013); Paschal Donohoe (FG, Dublin Central; 1996); Gary Gannon (Soc Dem, Dublin Central; 2012); Seán Haughey (FF, Dublin Bay N; 1985). See also alumni page here, and list of notable alumni here.

The parties

Fianna Fáil: Ireland's largest party at every election from 1932 to 2007 inclusive. Last in government from 1997 to 2011. Vote share plummeted to 17 pc in 2011 as a result of the economic crash. Regained some strength in 2016, then entered a supply and confidence arrangement under which it gave qualified support to the 2016–20 minority coalition government of Fine Gael and Independents. It was neck and neck with FG for much of the inter-election period but recently, and in polls during the current campaign, has had a slight lead over that party. No chance that it would again support a minority Fine Gael-led government as most of its members have found the last four years frustrating as it has regarded itself as being in opposition to FG while the (other) opposition parties have held it responsible for all government shortcomings on the ground that FF had the power to oust the government but did not do this. Leader has ruled out any coalition with either FG or SF but some voices within party favour leaving door open to coalition with SF. Expected to be the largest party in whatever government emerges after the current election. Support cross-class and strongest among oldest age groups. Leader since 2011: Micheál Martin.

Fine Gael: Ireland's second largest party at every election from 1932 to 2007 inclusive, but became the strongest party in 2011 and retained this position in 2016, though with a reduced vote. In government since 2011, first (2011–16) in a majority coalition with Labour, then (2016–20) in a minority coalition with Independents. Is perceived to have handled Brexit well but widely criticised for problems in areas of health and housing. Has ruled out coalition with SF but leader says open to idea of coalition with FF and would consider providing same confidence and supply arrangement to a FF-led minority government that FF gave it to it between 2016 and 2020. Support strongest among middle-class voters and farmers and among oldest age groups. Leader since 2017: Leo Varadkar.

Sinn Féin: Traditionally part of Ireland's republican movement, and the only party with a significant presence north and south. Became Ireland's largest left-wing party in 2016. Most of its results between 2016 and 2020 suggested the party was slipping in support: a poor presidential election in 2018, the loss of two of its three EP seats and of nearly half of its councillors in 2019, a reverse in NI in the December 2019 Westminster elections. Electorally, the only positive was a surprise success in the Dublin MW by-election in November 2019. However, inter-election polls consistently placed it with more support than the 14 pc that it won in 2016, and during the current campaign it is polling strongly: first very close behind FG, then ahead of it, and by 4 February ahead of FF as well. May have received a boost from the restoration of the NI Executive in January 2020 after its 3 years in abeyance, although events north of the border rarely have much impact on southern voters. Support disproportionately among working-class voters and young voters. Leader since 2018: Mary Lou McDonald.

Green Party: In government with FF from 2007 to 2011 and lost all its seats in 2011 following the economic crash. Regained Dáil representation in 2016 and had further success in 2019, winning 2 EP seats, quadrupling its number of local councillors, and winning its first ever by-election in November. Transfer-friendly and expresses willingness to go into government. Benefits electorally from concerns over climate change but this has not emerged as being as salient an election issue as had been anticipated. Expectations high for 2020 election, a mindset that sometimes leads to disappointment. Support highest among middle-class voters and young voters. Leader since 2011: Éamon Ryan.

Labour: Was leading representative of Ireland's (weak) left until 2016 election. Has not reached 20 pc of votes since 1922 election, but in government on a number of occasions, most recently 2011–16. That government continued the austerity measures introduced by the outgoing FF–Green government in response to the economic crash, and Labour in particular suffered electorally due to a perception that it had not adhered to its pre-election pledges, its vote subsiding to 7 pc in 2016. Few signs of recovery since then. The anger with which some voters regarded it in 2016 seems to have been replaced by something perhaps even more dangerous, namely indifference, and in the current campaign the party is struggling to make an impact. Support fairly similar among middle-class and working-class voters. Assumed to be open to a coalition arrangement with either FF or FG, but would prefer the former. Leader since 2016: Brendan Howlin.

Solidarity–People Before Profit: Alliance of two vocal far-left groupings that argue for radical societal, economic and political change. Increasingly dominated by the PBP part of the alliance, which is supplying three-quarters of its candidates. Not expected to be in government in the foreseeable future. Does not have a formal leader but its usual spokesperson in leadership debates is Richard Boyd Barrett (first elected to Dáil in 2011).

Social Democrats: Formed by 3 TDs in 2015, though one subsequently left and later joined FF. One of its two co-leaders was previously a Labour minister, who left that party partly because of dissatisfaction at its implementation of austerity policies while in government after 2011. Made modest gains in the 2019 local elections but has struggled to make a wider impression, support level is usually within the margin of error (ie 3 pc or lower). The only party that is running more women than men as candidates in the 2020 election. Co-leaders since 2015: Catherine Murphy and Róisín Shortall.

Aontú: Founded in 2019 by Peadar Tóibín TD after he left SF following his suspension from the party after he had opposed the party line on legalising abortion. The party has policies on many issues but opposition to abortion is its defining issue. Tóibín may be re-elected in Meath West but none of its other candidates is given any chance of winning a seat. Leader since 2019: Peadar Tóibín.

What are the issues?

Irish election campaigns are increasingly dominated by valence issues rather than position issues, and so far this looks like being no exception. In the first poll taken after the campaign began, 40% of respondents said that health was the issue that would have most influence on how they voted (voters outside Dublin, and elderly voters, were especially likely to give this response) and 32% specified housing. Health in particular is mainly a valence issue; differences between the parties are not great, and the question is which party can best establish a reputation for competence. When it comes to housing there are genuine differences between the parties, in particular over how direct a role the state should play in increasing the supply of housing, but undoubtedly many voters will be assessing the parties on the basis of credibility and commitment rather than by examining the details of their policy proposals. Climate change and Brexit receive much less recognition as salient issues.

Once the campaign began, all parties were surprised to discover that pensions constituted a significant concern for many voters. There are two aspects to this, which have become somewhat conflated: one involves the proposed incremental increase in the pension age to 67 in 2021 and to 68 by 2028, without which it is estimated the current state pension scheme will become unsustainable, and the other is that currently many people are obliged to retire at 65 and hence have to 'go on the dole' for a year or more until they qualify for the state pension, which is causing considerable resentment. The campaign discussion of the pensions issue illustrates yet again that the heat of an election campaign may not be the best time to make decisions about long-term issues.

Issue ownership is a significant factor; Brexit and the macro-economy are seen as good issues for Fine Gael, health and housing as good issues for the opposition parties. Thus far, those issues on which the government is evaluated poorly are to the fore. (See post by Stephen Kinsella of UL on the limited impact of the macro-economy on party support; the Irish Economy site has informed commentary and discussion on matters of economic policy.)

Implications for Ireland and Brexit

These are unlikely to be great, since there is a consensus among all the parties that are likely to win seats that Ireland's interests lie in remaining a full member of the EU rather than following the UK out of the EU or seeking any special deals with the UK that would distance it from the rest of the EU. There is also unanimous agreement that under no circumstances would a 'hard border' between the twenty-six county Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland be acceptable. Given this consensus among the parties, any change of government is very unlikely to lead to a change of policy. All that could change is the effectiveness with which this policy is promoted; the incumbent FG-led government has been praised by observers for its discharge of its responsibilities here, so it has an interest in trying to increase the salience of this policy issue and in casting doubt on whether any alternative government would be as well able to handle the issue. Thus far in the campaign, Brexit is a very peripheral issue.

Manifestoes

It has become the custom for parties to allow policies to emerge in a rather piecemeal fashion, with the formal manifestos launched some time into the campaign. Some policies are kept back until the manifestoes are launched; or, as some cynics see it, are hastily put together in the hours leading up to the manifesto launch in the light of what seems most likely to win votes. The manifestoes will be posted here once (and if) available.

In alphabetical order: Aontú manifesto; Fianna Fáil manifesto; Fine Gael manifesto; Green Party manifesto; Irish Freedom Party manifesto; Labour manifesto; National Party manifesto; People Before Profit manifesto; Renua manifesto; Sinn Féin manifesto; Social Democrats manifesto; Solidarity manifesto; Workers Party manifesto.

What do the opinion polls say?

Broadly speaking, most of the polls show FF as likely to be the largest party, though not much stronger than it was in 2016; FG well down on its 2016 performance; and SF gaining steadily, to the point where it was the strongest party in a poll published on 4 February. Recently, polls have had a tendency to under-estimate support for FF and FG, and their findings come with cautionary notes.

Polls during the campaign (date refers to date of publication):

In-depth poll analysis can be found at Michael Marsh's 'poll of polls' analysis on the RTE election site, and at the Irish Polling Indicator maintained by Tom Louwerse and Stefan Mueller. These two 'polls of polls' are usually slightly different, which perhaps creates the need for a 'poll of polls of polls'.

How many seats will the parties win?

Even if we knew how many votes each party would win, we could not be certain how many seats they would take. At least five factors affect the conversion of votes into seats: the vagaries caused by small constituency size (district magnitude), the fragmentation of the rest of the votes in each constituency, the evenness or lumpiness of a party's vote across the country, transfer patterns, and the degree of concentration of the party's own votes among its candidates; see fuller discussion here.

In 2020 we would not expect a very strong flow of transfers between any two parties. The Green Party will probably be the most transfer-friendly and Fine Gael, having been in office for nine years, the least transfer-friendly. Sinn Féin will not do well in transfers from Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael or the Greens, but will do well in transfers from the smaller left-wing parties and from many of the non-party candidates.

For the larger parties, receiving around 25 per cent of the votes could be expected to deliver around 47 seats, while 20 per cent would translate into, probably, the high 30s. At the start of the campaign everyone, including Sinn Féin itself, under-estimated SF's prospects, and the party is running only 42 candidates, eight fewer than in 2016, which puts a ceiling on its possible seat total, especially as some of these are standing in constituencies where the party has very little chance of winning a seat. For smaller parties, a lot depends on how concentrated the vote is; these parties usually dismiss national polls showing them with, say, 6 per cent of the votes on the basis that they have much greater strength than this in the constituencies where they are competitive. Displeasing poll findings can also be dismissed with the venerable cliché that "that's not what we're hearing on the doorsteps".

Are the betting markets a reliable guide to what will happen?

Probably not. A study of these markets at the 2007 election concluded that for the most part they followed the opinion polls rather than constituting an independent distillation of informed opinion (see here). By bookmakers' standards the amount of money waged on election markets is small, and it doesn't take much money to change them, sometimes dramatically. That is particularly true of the markets on individual constituency outcomes. Insofar as they usually capture conventional wisdom, they tend to be reasonably accurate as pointers, but they can be wrong as often as conventional wisdom is wrong. In 2016 a candidate who was priced at 1–100 (100–1 on, ie a virtual certainty) was defeated. Believing that a candidate's chances of being elected are improving simply because his / her odds are shortening would be a classic example of herd instinct in operation.

When will the result be known?

As indicated above, the main outlines of the 33rd Dáil will be known by late on the night of Sunday 9 February, though the final distribution of seats may take a day or more longer. That may well not make clear which parties will form the next government, though, something that could take days or even weeks longer. RTE Radio 1 is usually the best place to follow developments.

Which parties will form the next government?

In a multi-party system there are a number of possible combinations of parties. The 'identifiability' of government options – that is to say, whether voters are confronted with clear choices or whether, as is sometimes the case in multi-party systems, the options are unknown and emerge only out of post-election negotiations – varies from country to country and from election to election. At Ireland's 2007 election, identifiability was very low. On election day, the betting markets listed 11 possible governments, with the most likely (FF + Labour) having a probability of only 30 per cent; the eventual government, FF + Greens + PDs, was perceived on election day as being only the fifth most likely outcome, with a probability of just 8 per cent (more on this at page on betting and politics). In 2011, in contrast, identifiability was very high, with only two possible 'options': a coalition of FG and Labour being the more likely, and a single-party minority FG government having a slim probability. In 2016, once again, it was low.

On current forecasts, the only possible 2-party majority government after the 2020 election would be a coalition of FF and FG – but this has been firmly ruled out by FF (though not by FG). Both FF and FG have repeatedly ruled out the possibility that their party might go into coalition with SF. The options thus seem to be a coalition led by one of the two main parties (probably FF) and also including Labour and the Green Party, possibly including (or having some kind of agreement with) some independents, and possibly having a 'confidence and supply' arrangement with FG on terms similar to those agreed between FF and the FG–Independent coalition government of 2016–20.

Not everyone believes that FF and FG will necessarily adhere to their assurances that they would not coalesce either with each other or with SF, especially as it is known that within FF there are some who would be receptive to idea of forming a coalition government with SF even though the leadership has ruled out the possibility. The rationale for the change of stance would be along the lines of 'That's what we intended before the election, but the people have spoken and have elected a parliament in which a coalition between ourselves and them is the only possible stable government.' On the other hand, contrary to popular belief, politicians usually do keep their promises (see analysis of pledge fulfilment in successive How Ireland Voted books). And the main reason they do is because of the reputational cost of not doing so – both FG and FF know that to form a coalition with SF, having promised so firmly not to do so, would be thrown at them at every election for the next twenty years or more, with rhetorical questions as to how anyone can believe a word they say.

In 2016 government formation took 70 days, a record for Ireland (ie the longest time ever), and a quick process is not expected in 2020 either. If no agreement is reached, there may be a second 2020 election in May or June.

Further information

Due to time constraints it is unfortunately not always possible to respond to every question about the election campaign: what the main issues are, how the Dáil is elected, what the opinion polls have been saying, what the choices facing the voters are, which campaigning techniques are most effective, what the various parties stand for, who's likely to win, etc. Those seeking information might find the following sources useful, though of course there is the usual caveat that this page is not responsible for the content of external sites:

Running commentary on the election campaign, as well as on other subjects, can be found at the Political Reform site. The ElectionsIreland site maintained by Seán Donnelly and Christopher Took also has a huge amount of useful information, including listings of candidates in individual constituencies, and information on many of them. Elections are organised by the Department of the Environment, but the information on its elections web page is somewhat sparse. There is much information, especially from a geographical perspective, on Adrian Kavanagh's site. At recent elections Noel Whelan's up-to-the-minute books The Tallyman's Campaign Handbook have been invaluable thanks to their in-depth information on the candidates in every constituency and much more besides, but sadly Noel Whelan died on 10 July 2019, a great loss to Irish political analysis.

The RTE Election site has information on virtually every candidate, as well as Michael Marsh's much-discussed 'poll of polls' analysis. The Irish Times election site has information on each constituency. The WhichCandidate site gives the opinions of candidates on many issues and serves as a voting advice application by enabling users to see which candidate's views most closely match their own.

If you want to talk direct to an academic who studies Irish elections then, in the event of no-one from Trinity College being available, examination of the Political Reform site may lead you to a suitable authority.

For context and background to the 2016 election:

How Ireland Voted 2016. Was published later in 2016 by Palgrave Macmillan.

How Ireland Voted 2011 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). Account of the last Irish general election: what happened, what the main issues were, how much impact the campaign had, the impact of party leaders upon their parties' electoral fortunes, where and how the election was won and lost, how much swings varied across the country, which parties were best placed for next time, and so on; plus 8 pages of photographs. What lessons can parties and analysts learn about the 2016 campaign from the record of the 2011 campaign?

Politics in the Republic of Ireland, 6th ed (Abingdon: Routledge and PSAI Press, 2018). This has chapters on every aspect of politics and government, including a chapter explaining and assessing the distinctive PR-STV electoral system plus one on electoral behaviour.

How Ireland Voted 2007 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Account of the previous Irish general election: what happened, what the main issues were, how accurate or otherwise the polls were, how much impact the campaign had, the impact of party leaders upon their parties' electoral fortunes, where and how the election was won and lost, how much swings varied across the country, which parties were best placed for next time, whether the betting market is a reliable guide to what's going to happen, and so on; plus 37 pages of photographs. How much impact does a TV leaders' debate make?

How Ireland Voted 2002 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). Account of the 2002 Irish general election, with same format as 2007 volume; plus 17 pages of photographs.

For those who seek an informed view concerning the impact of developments in Northern Ireland upon politics south of the border, and the implications of the 2011 election for the Northern Ireland peace process, then a hub of expertise is the Institute of British-Irish Studies at UCD.

The Politics of Electoral Systems, paperback edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), ISBN 978-0-19-923867-5. Has a chapter explaining and examining PR-STV in Ireland in the context of electoral systems worldwide, asking how far aspects of Ireland's politics can be attributed to PR-STV. This chapter contains the reproduction of a PR-STV ballot paper, which you can view here.

Days of Blue Loyalty (Dublin: PSAI Press, 2002), ISBN 0-9519748-6-6. Analysis of a survey of members of the Fine Gael party published shortly before the 2002 election. Fine Gael fared very badly at that election, but the survey pointed to a commitment among its membership, which has been one factor determining its rise since then. This book explores the worldview, backgrounds and activity levels of the party's members.

And should you wish to study for a degree in Politics, the Department of Political Science at Trinity College Dublin has highly regarded undergraduate and postgraduate programmes.

Results 2016

The February 2016 election is fully analysed in How Ireland Voted 2016 (Springer / Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). For some discussion of why the government parties fared so badly despite the positive economic story of the previous five years, see politicalreform post here. The raw figures are:

 

Political Science home

MG home

Last updated 1 December, 2021 4:20 PM