Research Snapshots

Can you describe an area of your current research? What is the main idea or argument?

I work on metaphysics, specifically on the topic of modality. ‘Modality’ encompasses the notions of necessity, possibility and contingency. Modal assertions appear in a lot of contexts, for example:

‘there are N possible outcomes’;

‘these results could have been different’;

‘this is necessarily true’

The central question in the philosophy of modality concerns how assertions of this kind differ to their non-modal, straightforwardly truth-evaluable equivalents:

‘there is (or these are) N outcome(s)’

‘these are the results’

‘this is true’

Comparing these two sorts of assertions raises some interesting questions. Can we stipulate absolute, context-independent conditions for the truth or falsity of modal assertions? Does the apparent truth or falsity of modal assertions commit us to any substantive metaphysical claim about the world? A positive answer to either of these amounts to a view called realism; a negative answer to a denial of realism, or anti-realism.

What drew you to this particular topic?

My first philosophical project as an undergraduate was in philosophy of language. The two books that influenced me the most were Word and Object by W.V. Quine and Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language by Saul Kripke.

I extracted a view from Quine and (despite his intentions) Kripke which I identified as a kind of general semantic anti-realism. I defended that view in my undergraduate dissertation, and still do so. Later on, I became interested in anti-realist views of modality and was drawn to study under one of its proponents, John Divers. I also had several generous and inspiring teachers from the Department of Philosophy at Trinity whom I have to thank.

What new perspective or idea are you hoping to bring to philosophy with your work?

My PhD project vindicates another aspect of Quine’s philosophy, namely the critique of modal logic. I do this by developing an ‘ersatz’ theory of possible worlds (a la David Lewis) which is consonant with Quine’s critique.

The aim of the project is to motivate this ersatz theory as an alternative to a broadly realist view of modality. I proceed by examining various realist theses and testing whether this ersatz theory can provide sufficient surrogates for them.

To give an example, I am currently writing about the case of physical laws. An influential realist objection is that laws are something over and above best-descriptive regularities.

I argue that this objection is undermotivated, becuase maintaining it requires realists to either defend a superannuated project of conceptual analysis (‘the concept of law just is so-and-so’), or provide some non-circular, a posteriori ground for laws being so-and-so. I enumerate some reasons against both options.

December 2024