

Chapter 1: Historical Background

1.1 Early Post-War Period

- Europe in 1945 after War (Dresden Fig 1.1, concentration camps)
- Scale of death almost unimaginable (Table 1.1)



• Economic destruction






- Starvation: political instability
- Europe needed racial change.

- 'Blame Germany' v proof that Marx was right (communism best) v end nationalism
- Germany and Austria divided into 4 zones (Fig 1.2).
- Last won out: but communism taking hold.
- Also support in West): 1946
 elections, 19% in Italy, 29% in France
- USSR the new threat.
- Adenaur (1876-1967), Chancellor when aged 73 to 87 (Box 1.1)

Founding father of post-war Germany



• Franco-German alliance

- First steps: OEEC (Box 1.2 and European Payments Union (Box 1.3)
- Communist take-over of Czechoslovakia, Estonia, etc caused 'alarm' bells in US
- OEEC created under Marshall Plan
 1948
- OEEC influence waned in 1952: US then switching to NATO funding
- Contrast to 1930s Dramatic economic recovery (Tables 1.2 and 1.3)
- Strong but 'constrained' Germany (by being part of Europe)
- Italy also keen on Europe to combat fascism and communism

1.2 Federal v Intergovernmental View

 Persist to this day and at core of European disputes

- Countries most affected by War strongest on federal approach (i.e. Germany, France and Italy).
- UK, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland against.
- OEEC, Council of Europe and Court of Human Rights all intergovernmental
- ECSC (1952) major federalist move (see Box 1.5). 'Six' joined ECSC.
- Schuman and Monet the driving forces (see Box 1.4): both French.
- Major success and paved way for Treaty of Rome.
- Germany joined NATO in 1955 and Warsaw Pact formed in response.
- Europe 'needed' more integration: Monet plan for USE. Treaty of Rome March 1957. UK stayed out.
- EDC and EPC did not happen though (Box 1.6): Monet the driving force.

Citizen of Europe: German recognition of French 'Founding Father' of Europe




- Treaty extraordinary in its scope (see Ch 2 and photos Fig 1.3).
- Also set up European Court of Justice and European Parliament.
- Response of 'non Six' OEEC members: EFTA in 1960, led by UK (Box 1.7 and Box 1.8).
- Non-overlapping trade circles: EFTA and EU (EEC) (Fig 1.4)

1.3 Regional Domino Effect

 Common market the 'magnet'. 'Bear' story (p. 18)!

- Domino effect/euro in later decades
- UK applied to join in 1961. Also Ireland, Denmark and Norway.
- De Gaulle (Box 1.9), Non! (Fig 1.5, cartoon) 1963 and 1967.



- Three (UK, Denmark and Ireland) joined in 1973.
- Last EFTA members signed special trade agreements with EU.
- Two overlapping trade circles now.
 (Fig 1.6)

1.4 Euro-Pessimism (Fig 1.8)

- Booming European economy 1950 to 1973 ('Golden Age').
- But, dangers of nationalism and War soon forgotten.
- De Gaulle. 'Empty chair' policy. (Box 1.10) Took France out of NATO also.
- 'Luxembourg compromise' of unanimity.
- Slowed down decision-making in EU until 1986, if not 2010.
- Despite this, Werner report in 1971 and EMU by 1980.
- US profligate funding of Vietnam
 War a worry
- Oil crises of 1970s put paid to this. Reversion to national policies.
- Emergence of non-tariff or 'technical barriers to trade (TBTs).

- Major setbacks to European 'project'.
- Yet, remarkably Spain, Greece and Portugal joined in 1981 and 1986.
- EMS started in 1978, direct elections to Parliament in 1979.
- Thatcher 'revolution' in Europe. Mitterand followed.

1.5 Single Market Programme

Economic recovery in late 1980s.
 Emergence of Delors (Box 1.11).



- Single European Act in 1987. Signed by Thatcher.
- TBTs, capital controls etc addressed (see Ch 2).
- New majority-voting rules adopted.
- Focus on capital mobility: new development. Start of euro really.
- 'Outsiders' even more excluded now.
- Led to EEA (European Economic Area) agreement in 1989.
- Accepted EU rules, present and future, but did not shape them.
- Austria, Finland, Sweden joined 1995.
- Collapse of USSR a huge factor in change.

1.6 Collapse of Communism

- Huge gaps in economic well-being between East and West.
- Shocking state of East Germany.
- Perestroika (pro market reforms) and Glasnost (openness) in USSR in late 1980s. Gorbachev.
- Solidarity and Walesa in Poland in 1989 (Fig 1.10): not resisted by USSR.
- Reform in Hungary and opening of its borders to West.
- Leipzig peace marches.
- Drain from East Germany: Germany united in 1990.

Peaceful Revolution: East Germans invading the Stasi headquarters on January 16, 1990. The sign says "Down with Stasi, SED dictatorship and Nazism"



- Berlin Wall torn down. (Fig 1.9 and Fig 1.10)
- All risings from within country
- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1990 declared independence from USSR.
- USSR itself split up.
- United Germany welcome.
- Response was more European integration to 'tie' in Germany.
- Huge economic consequences for Germany for 15 years.

- Kohl and Mitterand supported Delors plan for EMU by 1999.
- Delors a hate figure in UK
- Maastricht Treaty 1992 set the agenda.



- EMU but also many other changes.
- For example, free movement of capital, stronger Parliament, Social Chapter.
- UK opted out of EMU and Social Chapter.
- Denmark rejected, later accepted (with opt outs on currency and other areas).

Just passed in France. Warning signs ignored.

1.7 Reuniting East and West

- What was to happen former sovietcontrolled East European states?
- Europe Agreements on trade the start.
- Adoption of EU law and practices.
- Reluctance to offer membership.
- Burden on EU budget and concerns about democratic principles.
- Copenhagen 1993: criteria for EU membership set down.
- 10 new members accepted, joined
 2004.

1.8 Enlargement: Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties

- Going from EU15 to EU25 needed major institutional change.
- Adjusted voting rules and composition of Commission and Parliament in particular (Ch 3).
- Nice Treaty 2001 flawed.
- Nice 'sold' as ending war and tyranny in East and got through.
- But needed two referenda in Ireland (Fig 1.11).
- Laeken Dec 2001 established the European Convention.
- Dominance of d'Estaing (Fig 1.12 and Fig 1.13). Led to Constitutional Treaty in 2003.
- Treaty accepted in Dublin in June 2004. ALL member states signed.

- French and Dutch rejected it in 2005 (Fig 1.14).
- Fear of enlargement and globalization at heart of rejection.
- Revised Lisbon Treaty accepted again by ALL governments June 2007.
- Too many concessions to France, UK and Poland ('bully' tactics work)?
- Rejected in referendum in Ireland in 2008 but accepted in 2009.
- Czech difficulties with Klaus in 2009.
 German Constitutional Court.
- UK Conservative Party attitude.
 Referendum in 2017, trying to reverse parts of Treaties
- Making workings of EU more efficient and increasing global projection of Europe (G3 not G2).
- Also increasing powers of European and National Parliaments.

Lisbon Treaty: tram that was used to transport the leaders




- Financial crisis 2010-13 (most of Module B).
- Led to further integration of EU.
- Banking, fiscal and political union next? Monet's vision to be realized?
- Fiscal Stability Treaty 2012. Outside EU framework
- Multi-speed Europe emerging?
- Germany, France, Italy and Spain around 250m people.
- Combined also won Olympics 2016 medal count!

- Economic sovereignty a myth in age of globalisation? Only together can states counter multinational companies, terrorism, climate change and so on
- Collapse of euro predicted in 2012 and 2013
- Also bicycle theory 'dusted off'.
- Federalist v intergovernmental debate in full swing again.
- UK preparing to exit EU, while others want to join
- Brexit Negotiations



Barnier and Davis: Chief Brexit Negotiators



How do they deal with this though?

- Future for 'City' if Brexit?
- Franco/German 'engine' reignited?
 Macron and Merkel
- Juncker speech to European Parliament, 13th Sept 2017
- Continuing Ukraine Crisis




Key Players 2017-2019



Merkel and Juncker



Macron and Tspiras: At the 'Home' of European Democracy, Sept 2017



Chapter 2: Facts, Law, Institutions and Budget

2.1 Economic Integration


- Focus on economic integration as stepping stone
- Treaty of Rome Articles far reaching (Box 2.1, Box 2.2, Box 2.3 and Fig 2.1)
- 'Ever closer union' the underlying objective: UK objections



Signing of Treaty of Rome 1957

- Free trade in goods: no tariffs, quotas or TBTs.
- Common trade policy: CET implies pooling of sovereignty.
- Ensuring undistorted competition.
- No state aids, harmonization of regulatory laws.
- Harmonization of taxes.
- Competition policy central: no price fixing, no preferential treatment of national industries, etc.

- Standardise regulations blocking competition (i.e. remove TBTs).
- Unrestricted trade in <u>services</u>. Not yet achieved.
- Capital mobility: rights of establishment; physical investment.



- Macroeconomic co-ordination: reduce exchange-rate fluctuations.
- EMS in 1979 and euro in 1999.
- European Semester in 2013: much more co-ordination of fiscal policies
- CAP: Huge sector in 1950s. Part of German/French pact. (Ch. 9)
- Social policies

- Political agreement difficult and perhaps EU policies not needed?
- Regional Policy; need balanced growth in EU for it to survive and prosper (Ch. 10)
- Taxation; common base v common rates. Apple decision related to former and NOT latter
- Quantifying European economic integration (Fig 2.2).
- What counterfactual the problem

2.2 EU Structures pre- and post-Lisbon

- Federalists v intergovernmentalists again: or vanguard v 'doubters
- Brexit has brought all of these issues 'centre-stage'.
- Worries re creeping competences and 'community method'.

- European Court given power to interpret Treaty of Rome.
- Confusion in UK with European Court of Human Rights (not part of EU)
- Court could introduce laws to achieve Treaty objectives .
- Worry also of multi-speed Europe or 'variable geometry'.
- Allowed some to proceed in certain areas (e.g. Schengen Accord (Fig 2.3), euro zone).
- Also association status with EU; for example, Norway and Switzerland.
 Not in EU but still de facto part of it
- UK to be in similar position in future?
- Fiscal Stability Treaty for euro zone outside EU framework also
- Three Pillars but one 'roof'. (Fig 2.4)

- Pillar 1 relates to Single Market and EMU and majority voting applies.
- Pillar 2: Foreign and Security policy.
 Unanimity required.
- Pillar 3: Justice and Home Affairs. Now in Pillar 1. Opt outs though.
- Many grey areas still and law not clear often until tested in courts.
- Response to euro crisis could dramatically change whole structure.
- And hasten moves to political union.
- Implications of UK exit: others follow and EU collapses or new impetus to greater integration?

2.3 EU Law

 Court of Justice unique in world (Fig 2.5)




- Can overrule national courts and often does, especially in relation to trade and competition issues
- Uses case law to establish principles
- EU now has enormous mass of laws, rules and practices
- Three principles: direct effect, primacy of EU law and autonomy of EU legal system. (Box 2.6)
- EU law applies automatically and directly to EU citizen.
- Primacy. Overrules national law where latter contravenes EU law.

 Autonomy. Can hear cases without having to go to any national court.

2.4 'Big 5' Institutions

- European Council: President, Van Rompuy (Box 2.7, Fig 2.6), now Tusk, former PM Poland
- Heads of state and deals with broad parameters of EU policy
- 'Conclusions of Presidency' document at end of each meeting.
- Put into legal format though only after Council Meetings.
- Council of European Union or Council of Ministers (Fig 2.7)
- All elected officials. Main task is to adopt new laws.
- QMV for 80% of decisions
- Approval Parliament also required for most new laws (see Chap 3).

- Decides also on foreign (e.g. aid, Fig
 2.8) and peace-keeping issues.
- Presidency of the EU: Commission V Council v country PM.
- 'Foreign minister'. Ashton (Box 2.8)
 but Mogherini now
- European Commission: propose and initiate, administer/implement.



- And provides surveillance and enforcement of competition law
- 'Guardian' of EU and 'Standardbearers' for EU integration

- Membership and Size of Commission an issue in Lisbon Treaty (Fig 2.8).
- Chosen together and for five years
- Must be approved by EU Parliament.
- Commission nominated by national govts but <u>not</u> as representatives.
- Juncker had no role in who appointed but had power to allocated briefs
- Ministries or DGs. About 17,000 employed, less than Vienna city council.
- Right of initiative crucial. Huge consultation though.
- Executive powers in Competition;
 biggest trading block in world
- Brussels the 'world capital' of competition and regulatory policy.
- Others follow when it sets standads
- Consensus decision making.

European Parliament (Fig 2.9).
 Increased legislative power and 'check' on Commission.

Ukip members turn their backs on EU anthem, Beethoven's 'Ode to Joy', at opening of new Parliament, June 2014



- 'Conscience' of EU.
- Smaller nations over represented
- Not organized on national but EU party basis.
- Location rows. Strasbourg v Luxembourg v Brussels.
- Council and Parliament the democratic controls.

- Low turnout though and fought on local issues.
- Court of Justice (Fig 2.10). Settles disputes.
- Unexpectedly large impact on EU integration.



German Constitutional Court

- Courts v parliament also in every country.
- Legislation v case law

2.5 Legislative Processes

Co-decision procedures (Box 2.9).

- Interaction between Commission,
 Council and Parliament.
- Role of national parliaments: 'yellow' and 'orange cards'.
- Enhanced co-operation or 'variable geometry'. (Box 2.10 on divorce)
- May be way forward in future, especially dealing with euro crisis and Brexit.
- Better all on board? Or just key players like France, Germany and Italy?
- 200m in these countries alone. Why not form a new EU with just these three? Or with four or five?

2.6 Some Important Facts about EU



- Huge variation by country (Fig 2.11).
- Big six: Germany, France, UK, Italy,
 Spain and Poland
- Medium-sized countries: 8 11 m.
- Ireland not much bigger than greater Barcelona or Milan.
- Same story with incomes. Small, tiny and miniscule economies. (Table 2.1)
- Huge variation in income per head (Fig 2.11 and also see later, Ch. 10)
- Link to Regional Policy. Fears of 'Golden Triangle'

EU similar in size but larger than US:
 EU v US the valid comparison?
 Sports (Olympics, tennis and golf)
 science, Nobel Prizes, military. EEA v
 AEA)

2.7 Budget

 Spent on what? Sources of finance?
 Which countries get most? How is budget decided?



 Expenditure. Agriculture (46%), poor regions (31%) and other things (23%). (Fig 2.12)

- Others. Other internal policies (7%) such as R & D, trans-European infrastructural projects.
- Spending on farming 60 times that on foreign aid.
- Administration (7%): all EU institutions employ only around 30,000, tiny really.
- Just 1 % of EU GDP: less than 2% of total EU PSE.
- Regional v agriculture since early 1990s. (Fig 2.13)
- Net payments by member state rarely exceed 0.1% of GDP.
- Per capita v total expenditure in each country (Fig 2.14) Former better.
- Big variation but totals tiny.
- Main benefits by far are free trade and economic stability and growth:


which increase GDP maybe by 5% over several years.

- Revenue sources. (Fig 2.15)
- Historic evolution.
- Proportion of VAT receipts and GNP based contributions the key now.
- Contributions by state (gross v net).
- German net contributions.
- Budget process (see pp. 84/85)



Pattern for all EU decisions?

Seven-year budget plans: 2014-2021



Chapter 3: Decision Making



3.1 Task Allocation and Subsidiarity

- Different levels of government: decision making AND voting rules
- Within a country also, e.g. US, Germany or Switzerland.

- Subsidiarity: decision making as close to the people as possible
- Within counties again: Scotland v UK,
 Catalonia v Spain, Kerry v Ireland (latter ends at M50 charge!)
- Individual sovereignty v state (e.g. wearing helmets on bikes, planning laws)
- Proportionality principle: action should be minimal.
- Burden of proof on proposers not opponents.
- National parliaments the 'watchdogs' re subsidiarity.
- Need flexibility, or else Treaty votes every few months.
- Competences in practice (list in Table 3.1).
- Exclusive to EU, shared, support/coordination.

- Lisbon made clearer the boundaries.
- Often though only decided in courts.
- Co-ordination is 'soft' power and has only peer-effect force.

3.2 Theory Fiscal Federalism



'The history of fiscal federalism may offer the euro zone some lessons' *Economist* 11th Feb 2012. Will Sarkozy be back!

 Big issue in US, Germany and Canada for decades

Basic Trade-Offs (3.2.1)

Need Common Rules for Free movement of goods, services people and capital (pro central decision making)

- This is the over-riding need in EU but not in book!
- How can you have the 'game' of football or trade or free movement with centrally-decided rules of engagement
- Apple decision: enforcing rules of engagement and ensuring a level playing field
- Also safety issues, information and so on.

Diversity and Local Informational Advantages (Pro Local)

• Box 3.1 (separate acetate): density of public bus service example.

Local information best, but

Scale Economies (Anti)

- Bigger the bus company the lower the cost per km? (Box 3.2).
- Balance depends on slope of curves and extent of scale economies

Spillovers: from one country to another (Anti)

- Euro example: positive benefits for ALL nations
- Environment, terrorism, illegal trade, competition other major examples
- Tax competition example: negative for all.
- No excise competition between Ireland and Greece.(Box 3.3)

Democracy as a Control Mechanism (Pro, politics close to people)



- Elections a discipline/check.
- In politics, whole package v specific measures.
- 'Parish pump' politics danger though.
- Higher the level of government the wider the package.
- True at local govt. level in Ireland?
- Local v national v EU: <u>all</u> forms of democracies flawed, including EU.
 For example, unelected upper house in UK and first past the post system

Jurisdictional Competition (Pro)

- Vote with one's feet by migrating.
- Tiebout model

From Theory to Practice (3.2.2)

- In practice always judgmental: no clear or simple answers, despite populist claims.
- Huge scale economies to an EU defence force.
- But many countries (including Ireland) object.
- Example of recognition of pension, divorce and property rights.

3.3 Economical View of EU Decision Making

Qualified majority voting (3.3.1)

• The actual distribution of votes (Fig 3.3): Nice, and Lisbon, post 2014.

EU ability to act: decision-making efficiency (3.3.2)

- Need precise definition
- Inability to act though caused euro crisis and now the refugee crisis
- Inability to act caused by member states NOT by 'Brussels'
- Concept of 'passage probability' (Table 3.2): note error. 27 countries implies 134 million possible outcomes!
- 80% of EU legislation by 'codecision'.
- Qualified majority (71%) Council of Ministers and simple majority in Parliament

- Assume always vote on national lines.
- Probability depends on:
 - Number of countries (6, 15, 25, etc),
 - Distribution of votes by country, and
 - Majority threshold (51% or 60% or 71% for example): 100% if veto.
- Simple example
- Fig 3.4 charts effect of number of countries on probability.
- 21.9% in EU 6, 7.8% in EU15, 2.3% in EU 29! Under Lisbon up to 12.2%.
- Nice Treaty: 71% of votes still but higher share to big states.
- As well as half of all states and 62% of population ('triple lock')
- Is passage probability a useful measure though?

- EU has and does work: usually at last minute and in response to a crisis though: see all-night 'pillow fights' cartoon earlier
- Role of Commission and Parliament.
- What about 'horse trading'?
- Also, intensity of preferences, agenda fixing, and 'moral suasion'.
- Veto power the most serious blockage to decision making.
- But not covered in book!

3.4 Distribution of Power between Member States

 The 'populist' version of the story is in image below, but soon to be without UK flag!



- How to measure power though?
- Veto the ultimate power.
- Share of Council vote v share of budget a good indicator?
- Parliament not important here (see Box 3.4).
- Cannot ignore any more especially since Lisbon: remember it is the conscience of the EU (e.g. Apple decision)

- Budget must be 'sold' to each national electorate.
- High correlation. But budget just over 1.3% of EU GDP.
- Major benefits by far may be through increased GDP.
- Other limitations: three countries with 20, 40, 40 share of vote.
- All have same power to block (i.e. if 50% the threshold). Always need two countries to support.
- If threshold raised to 75%, first country has no power.
- Luxembourg Case (Box 3.5)
- Branzhaf Index (3.4.3) measures 'probability of a country being able to block a decision. Same results as with 'crude' measure. (Table 3.3 and Box 3.6)

- Power shifts following Lisbon (3.4.4) (Fig 3.6).
- Huge political reaction: in Poland and Spain in particular


3.5 Legitimacy in EU decision making



 Each country puts on a display of protecting the national interest against Brussels, whatever latter means.

- EU an extraordinary enterprise:
 voluntary pooling of sovereignty
- Experience of two wars, and perhaps now banking, migration and terrorist crises the keys.
- Is voting distribution in Council fair or legitimate though?
- Citizens v nations.
- Former or latter, or some combination of both?
- Power of veto in certain areas was critical to joining EU.
- Yet, veto means Ireland (1% of EU pop.) can block wishes of 99%.
- US Congress example: Senate (same number of members by State regardless of size) and House of Representatives (strictly according to population). German example more complicated.

- Fair power distribution by citizen: but only where veto does *not* apply.
- Also, Big Six account for vast bulk of population.
- Does <u>not</u>, to repeat, consider the veto issue.
- Nor problems with referendums (for example, Lisbon in Ireland, Brexit vote).



A policy problem also within countries